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Economic and Political Changes and 
Import Demand Behavior of North Korea 
 




We study some empirical aspects of North Korean economy implied in its import behavior 
in the period before the collapse of Soviet Union. Our analysis is based on econometric inference 
for a cointegration relation and some model determination methods. We have found that for North 
Korean economy some non-market factors are important determinants of the import behavior. The 
non-market factors are related to the country’s political situations, its political relation with two 
communist superpowers, and its relation with western industrialized countries. Our results show 
that the non-market factors have different impacts on imports from different countries and imports 
for different commodity groups, which enables us to find some interesting aspects of North 
Korean economy.  Among several results those with the following two implications are of 
particular interests. First, the two communist superpowers were overall stable and the most 
important suppliers to North Korean economy regardless of the political situation while Western 
countries filled the deficiency, if any, caused by Sino-Soviet dispute. Second, the foreign debt 
problem had significantly negative impacts on imports from the capitalist countries, which is true 





North Korean economy is characterized by the following two facts: First, the door has 
been firmly closed throughout. Second, the central government controls almost every part of 
the economy. Because the door has been closed throughout and also because data have not 
been made public in North Korea (NK), only very limited information about the economy is 
available. The behavior of NK’s imports is one of a few sources of information on the 
economy for which data are available from trading partners. In this paper, we study empirical 
behavior of North Korean imports to find what are practically important factors determining 
the level of imports of the country. 
In economics we usually assume that the national income and relative prices are the 
main determinants of the level of imports. In the case of NK, however, we might need to 
consider additional factors for  explaining the behavior of imports,  in particular,  some 
non-market political factors. Planners in Pyongyang control imports in order to advance 
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friendship and political relationship with foreign countries as well as for economic reasons. 
In this paper we consider several non-economic factors such as the relationship between 
China and the former USSR, the foreign debt problem of North Korea since 1970’s and 
changes of the NK’s open-door policy.   
Political conflict between China and the former USSR, which is called ‘Sino-Soviet 
dispute’, often got NK into trouble of deciding which side to be closer to. Sometimes, 
however, the dispute could be a chance for NK for dealing with the two super-powers in 
order to get better supports of them.
1 On the other hand, it is well known that the North 
Korean economy has been suffering from foreign debt problems since the mid-1970s. 
Because of the inability of paying back its foreign debts North Korea lost its credit, which 
causes difficulty in obtaining loans from the non-communist countries. As a consequence, 
the country could not have enough  fund to  finance imports of physical capital and 
technology from western countries. To solve this difficulty, the planners decided to attract 
direct foreign investment in 1984, which is called ‘the Joint Venture Law.’ However, this 
new policy did not seem to work well. 
The following two results among others are of particular interest in this paper. First, 
Sino-Soviet dispute did not have a significant impact on imports from the two communist 
superpowers and also for such commodity groups as manufactured goods and machinery. 
This implies that the two communist superpowers were overall stable suppliers to North 
Korean economy. At the same time, however, Sino-Soviet dispute did have significant 
impacts on imports from western industrialized countries, especially imports from 
developing countries. Also, Sino-Soviet dispute had significant impacts on imports of such 
commodity groups as food, live animals, beverages and tobacco. An implication of this result 
is that the items imported from the two communist superpowers were different, and 
Sino-Soviet dispute might have impacts on imports of certain items. Then,  Western 
industrialized countries filled the deficiency, if any, caused by Sino-Soviet dispute. Second, 
the foreign debt problem had significantly negative impacts on imports from the capitalist 
countries for most commodity groups, which is true even after the new open door policy 
initiated by the Joint Venture Law of 1984. This implies that the lost credit caused by the 
accumulated foreign debts damaged the economic relationships between North Korea and the 
capitalist countries and that the damaged relationships were not improved by the new open 
door policy. 
Our analysis in this paper goes as follows. We first choose the most appropriate model 
for North Korean import behavior out of several alternatives. Next, based on the chosen 
model we investigate which factors are important determinants of North Korea’s imports. To 
find the most appropriate model we follow the following steps of model determination: First, 
for several models under study we apply tests  for cointegration  to check whether the 
relationships in the models are economically meaningful. Second, we apply model selection 
criteria such as Bayesian information criterion and Akaike information criterion to select the 
best model out of a few nested alternatives. On the other hand, in order to find significance 
of each factor for determining North Korea’s import behavior we  apply an  inference 
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procedure for a cointegration relation based on a dynamic regression.   
Section II considers some possible models for the import function of North Korea. In 
Section III we  explain  econometric methods used for our analysis.  Section IV provides 
empirical results on import behavior of North Korea, and Section V concludes the paper. 
 
II. The Import Function   
 
1. Basic Models 
 
In economics we usually assume that the demand for imports is determined by overall 
price and the level of national income (see Leamer and Stern (1970)). Assuming log-linearity 
we have the following econometric model: 
 
t t t t u Y P M + + + = log log log 2 1 0 b b b ,                                    (1) 
 
where  M   is the quantity of imports,  Y  is an income variable,  P   is a price index, and 
u  is the disturbance. 
Alternatively, researchers use slightly modified models of ( 1)  including a l agged 
dependent variable in the right hand sides of the equation:   
 
t t t t t u M Y P M + + + + = -1 3 2 1 0 log log log log b b b b .                          (2) 
 
The model (2) can be interpreted as a partial adjustment mechanism for import demand while 
the model (1) is an equilibrium model. In an equilibrium model the actual quantity of import 
is always equal to the quantity demanded, which is possible when the quantity adjusts 
instantaneously to changes in the prices (P) and the income (Y). On the other hand, in the 
partial adjustment mechanism it takes time for the quantity to adjust.
2   
 
2. Import Functions for the North Korean Economy 
 
The basic import functions in Section II.1 are applied for many studies (See for 
example, Khan (1974), Gafar (1988), and Halpern and Szekely (1992).). For analyzing NK’s 
import behavior we augment the basic model of Section II.1 by including some non-market 
factors such as (1) NK’s political relations with China and the former Soviet Union;
3 and (2) 
open-door polices, especially policies regarding NK’s relations with Western industrialized 
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countries.
4   
To  augment our basic model in Section II.1 we define some variables for the 
non-market factors. Denote by Pol the country’s political relations with the two communist 
super-powers: Pol = 1 for the period of North Korea’s leaning toward China, and Pol = 0 
otherwise.
5 Also, for NK’s open door policy we use a variable Open: (1) Open1 = 1, for the 
period of 1970-1974 and = 0, otherwise; (2) Open2 = 1, for the period of 1975-1983 and = 0, 
otherwise; and (3) Open3 = 1, for the period of 1984-1992 and = 0, otherwise (see footnote 3). 
We obtained annual data for the period 1962-1992. Most of data are from the United 
Nations (UN). Data that are not available from UN are obtained from official publications of 
North Korea’s trading partners. For example,  Zhong-guo Jin-ji Nian-jian (Almanac of 
China’s Economy) for China, and Vneshniaia torgovlia SSSR (Foreign Trade of the USSR) 
for the Soviet Union. 
In Table 1 we have four different models for NK’s import behavior discussed above. 
 
Table 1   Alternative Models of NK’s Import Demand 
A.  t t t t u Y P M + + + = log log log 2 1 0 b b b  
B.  t t t t t u M Y P M + + + + = -1 2 1 0 log log log log d b b b  
C.  t t t t Open Open Open Pol Y P M q b b b b b b b + + + + + + + = 3 2 1 log log log 6 5 4 3 2 1 0  
D.  2 1 log log log log 5 4 3 1 2 1 0 Open Open Pol M Y P M t t t t b b b d b b b + + + + + + = -  
           t Open q b + + 3 6  
Notes: Pol is a dummy variable representing the changes of North Korea’s relations with China: Pol = 1, for 1962 £ 
t £ 1964 or 1969 £ t £ 1978 or 1982 £ t £ 1983 or 1988 £ t £ 1992, and Pol = 0, for otherwise. 
 
Model A  is  the  equilibrium model (1), and model B  is the model (2) for the  partial 
adjustment mechanism. Models C and D are, respectively, augmented versions of models A 
and B including our non-market factors.   
 
III. Model Selection and Inference 
 
1. Model Selection 
 
We want to choose the most appropriate model among the four alternative specifications 
 
4. During the period of 1962-1992 North Korea’s open-door policy changed three times: (1) expansion of imports 
and attraction of a foreign loan from Western industrialized countries (1970~1974); (2) shrinking back to the 
closed economy mostly due to the foreign debts problem (1975~1983); (3) attraction of foreign investment under 
the debts problem (1984~1992). See Tamaki (1988).   
5. North Korea’s relations with China and the former Soviet Union has changed by the following way: (1) 
1962-1964: leaning toward China; (2) 1965-1968: leaning toward Soviet; (3) 1969-1978: positive neutrality while 
leaning slightly toward China; (4) 1979-1981: leaning toward Soviet; (5) 1982-1983: leaning toward China; (6) 
1984-1987: leaning toward Soviet; and (7) 1988-1992: leaning toward China. See Chung (1978) and Clough 
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in Table 1 for NK’s import function. First of all we need to know whether each of the models 
under consideration is a stable dynamic system. A widely used concept relevant to dynamic 
stability is the idea of a long-run equilibrium implied by cointegration, which is particularly 
so in a dynamic system containing nonstationary variables. All three of our variables, log t M , 
log t P  and log t Y  are found to be  ) 1 ( I  processes. Thus, in order to make sure that a model 
has some economic relevance as a stable system, we need to check whether or not the model 
is cointegrated. After finding that some models are cointegrated, we choose the model that 
best fits the data out of a set of cointegrated models. Since models A-D in Table 1 form a set 
of nested models, we can apply such decision criteria as Akaike (1973) information criterion 




2. Significance of Each Factor 
 
For a system  with  ) 1 ( I  variables standard  classical inference on significance of 
variables, which is based on normal distribution theory, often fails to apply. However, if the 
system forms a cointegrated relation, we can apply standard classical inference in some cases 
for testing significance. For example, consider the following system 
 
*
2 1 t t t z y + ¢ + = y g a ,                                                    (3) 
 
t t t 2 1 , 2 2 u y y + = - ,                                                       (4) 
 
where  t y1  is a scalar and  t 2 y  is a  1 · k  vector. If  t y1   and  t 2 y  are both  ) 1 ( I  but 
*
t z  
and  t 2 u   are  ) 0 ( I , then, for  1 + = k n , the n-dimensional vector ( t y1 ,  t 2 y¢ )¢ is cointegrated 
with the cointegration relation given by (3). For a special case when 
*
t z  and  t 2 u  are 
uncorrelated i.i.d. processes with mean zero and finite variances, the asymptotic distribution 
of the  ordinary least square estimator of the coefficients (a,  g¢ )¢ conditional on 
) , , , ( 2 22 21 T y y y K   is jointly normal.   
However, the assumption of uncorrelatedness of 
*
t z  and  t 2 u  is hard to hold for 
many cases of practical interest. In the case when 
*
t z  and  t 2 u   are correlated, Phillips and 
Loretan (1991), Saikkonen (1991) and Stock and Watson (1993) suggest to correct the 
problem by augmenting the Equation (3) with leads and lags of  t 2 y D . More specifically, the 




- + D ¢ + ¢ + =
p
p s
t s t s t t z y ~
, 2 2 1 y y b g a ,                                          (5) 
 
 
6. We use BIC studied in Phillips (1996) and Kim (1998) for models with nonstationary variables.   JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
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where  t z ~  is the residual of a linear projection of 
*
t z  on  s t s t - - D = , 2 , 2 y u  for 
p p p s , , 1 , K + - - = . Then, by construction  t z ~  is uncorrelated with  s t s t - - D = , 2 , 2 y u  for 
p p p s , , 1 , K + - - = . The lag-length  p is chosen so that 
*
t z  and  s t- , 2 u  for  p s >  are not 
correlated. For the regression model (5), standard asymptotic theory applies for the sampling 
behavior of the estimator of the coefficient (a,  g¢)¢ conditional on  ). , , , ( 2 22 21 T y y y K  In 
this case the  F  test-statistic for testing a linear restriction on the coefficient has an 
asymptotic 
2 c   distribution multiplied by a constant. More specifically, for testing the null 
hypothesis  r R Ho = g : , the F-statistic has the following asymptotic property:   
 
( ) ) (
2 2 2 ~ m s F T
p
T c l ￿ﬁ ￿                                                 (6) 
 
where  m  is the number of restrictions in the null hypothesis; 
2




, 2 2 1













s t s T t y y n T b g a y  
 
 
and  ) 1 (
~
sy l =  for  t t L z e y ￿ = ) ( ~   with  t e  being a white noise. Consistent estimators of 
the multiplicative factor of the  F-statistic are discussed in Phillips and Loretan (1991), 
Saikkonen (1991) and Stock and Watson (1993). In practice, for determining  p  we can use 
BIC and AIC.   
 
3. Results from Aggregate Data 
 
For explanatory purposes we apply in this section the econometric methods explained 
above for aggregate data. Our main empirical analysis is discussed in Section IV for 
disaggregate data. As shown in Table 2 below the unit root hypothesis is not rejected for all 
the three variables, log t M , log t P  and log t Y  with the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) t-test. 
For all these three variables the unit root hypothesis cannot be rejected even at 10% level. 
 
Table 2    The Results of Unit Root Test 
  t M log   t Y log   t P log  
ADF t-statistic  1.77  1.58  1.69 
Note: The 10% critical value is  3.23. 
 
In Table 3 we provide the results of cointegration test and the values of BIC and AIC 
for each of the models A-D for the aggregate data. We find that models C and D are 
cointegrated while models A and B are not (by 5% ADF t-test). Hence, the models C and D 
are stable dynamic systems while the models A and B are not. On the other hand, both BIC 
and AIC have minimum values for the model D. We, therefore, choose the model D as the 
best model for North Korea’s import behavior. LIM AND KIM: IMPORT DEMAND BEHAVIOR OF NORTH KOREA 
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Table 3   Cointegration Test and Information Criteria 
  Cointegration Test  Model Selection 
  ADF t-stat.  Conclusion  AIC  BIC 
Equation A  3.35 ( 3.80)  not cointegrated  2.85  2.71 
Equation B  3.60 ( 4.16)  not cointegrated  3.22  3.03 
Equation C  4.89 ( 3.80)  cointegrated  3.07  2.75 
Equation D  5.11 ( 4.16)  cointegrated  3.45  3.08 
Note: The values in the parentheses are 5% critical values for rejecting the null of no cointegration.   
 
Now, we want to explain results on significance of each factor (Section III.2) for the 
aggregate data. Correlation coefficients between the disturbance of model D (
*
t z ) and each 
of differences of regressors ( t 2 y D ) are shown in Table 4 Correlation between  1 log - D t M   and 
the residual of model D is not small, while correlation between  P log D  and the residual and 
correlation between  Y log D  and the residual are relatively small. 
 
Table 4  Correlation Matrix 
  1 log - D t M   P log D   Y log D   Residuals of Equation D 
1 log - D t M   1.000  0.353  0.293  0.323 
P log D   0.353  1.000  0.546  0.046 
Y log D   0.293  0.546  1.000  0.022 
Residuals of Equation D  0.323  0.046  0.022  1.000 
 
Table  5 provides the results of augmenting the model D by adding various 
combinations of different components of  t 2 y D . For each model we can compute the values 
of BIC and AIC to have the best choice for the value of  p. The result is  0 = p . 
 
Table 5  Correction for the Correlation between Difference of Regressors and 
Residual of Augmented Equation 
Correction for the Correlation  Model Selection  New Correlation with Residuals 
No. Lists of Adjustment  lag-length AIC  BIC  1 log - D t M   t Y log D   t P log D  
#1  1 log - D t M , P log D , Y log D 0 = p   -3.54  -3.02  -1.69E 16
*  -1.85E 16
*  3.07E 15
* 
#2  1 log - D t M , Y log D   0 = p   -3.59  -3.12  -5.18E 16
*  0.059  2.79E 15
* 
#3  1 log - D t M , P log D   0 = p   -3.60  -3.13  3.13E 16
*  -3.66E 16
*  -0.029
* 
#4  1 log - D t M   0 = p   -3.64  -3.21  -5.37E 16
*  0.144  -0.138 
* : The null of no correlation is not rejected at 5% level. 
 
For the augmented regression (5) including Open1 as well as other variables, we find 
that Open1 is insignificant in all cases under consideration (Table 6) while other variables 
are significant in all the cases based on 5% test. Also, the regression without Open1 yields 
lower values of AIC and BIC in each case than the regression with Open1. 
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Table 6  Difference Between Including and Excluding Open1 
Constant  t Y log   t P log   1 log - t M Correction
* 
for Correlations 
Pol  Open1  Open2  Open3 
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Y log D   -0.090 
(1.35) 
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Y log D   -0.101 
(1.93) 




































1 log - D t M , 
P log D   -0.088 
(1.37) 








Note: The t-value is provided in each parenthesis below the coefficient estimate; 
* : Listed variables are included as 
regressors for correcting the correlations between difference of regressors and the residual. 
 
In sum, we have the following specification as the best model for the import function 
of North Korea for the aggregate data: 
 
4 1 3 2 1 0 log log log log a a a a a + + + + = - t t t t M Y P M (Correction with a set of   
 
t t Open Open Pol P Y M e a a a + + + + D D D - 3 2 ) log , log , log 7 6 5 1 .         (7) 
 
 
IV. Regression Results of North Korean Import Function: For Different Countries and 
Different Commodity Groups 
 
In this section we provide some empirical results on the import behavior of NK  for 
imports from different countries and for different commodity groups. For each disaggregate 
data we examine all the possible model specifications that are discussed in the previous 
section based on the model D.   
 
1. Imports from Different Countries 
 
We have  data on each of the variables from 1962 through 1992.
7 The volume of 
imports ( t M ) is the value of imported goods, the exchange rate is used for the relative price 
 
7. Since  North Korea has not released any trade-related data since the mid-1960s, our data are obtained from the 
corresponding quantities reported by North Korea’s trading partners.   LIM AND KIM: IMPORT DEMAND BEHAVIOR OF NORTH KOREA 
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( t P ), and the real GNP is used for the real income ( t Y ).
8 T able  7 provides the results of 
estimating variants of ( 7) for data from different countries. The model for each country 
presented in Table 7 is the most appropriate model based on the procedure in Section III.
9   
The income elasticity of imports is higher for imports from capitalist countries than 
that for imports from communist countries. Notice that the income elasticity for imports from 
developing capitalist countries is the highest while that from China is the lowest. It implies 
that communist countries, especially China, is the most stable supplier to North Korean 
economy. On the other hand, the relative price P is not statistically significant at the 5% level 
for each country, which confirms the common view that relative prices are not important 
factors determining the volume of imports in communist countries.
10 
 
Table 7    Estimated Regression Equations of NK’s Imports: by Countries 
 
Const.  t Y log   t P log   1 log - t M   Correction
* 
for Correlations 
Pol  Open2  Open3 

















































































































































































Notes: The t-value is provided in each parenthesis below the coefficient estimate; 
* : Listed variables are included as 
regressors for correcting the correlations between difference of regressors and residual; 
**  : Japan is not 
included in OECD countries. 
 
8. Since  North Korea has not published any consistent data  on GNP, we use the values estimated by South Korean 
National Unification Board. 
9. Although we do not include the results of cointegration test in Tables 7 - 9 , we checked that the models in the 
tables are all cointegrated ones.   
10. See Houthakker and Magee (1969) and Magee (1975).     JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
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Another piece of evidence  found in Table  7 is that the change in North Korea’s 
political relations with China and USSR, which is characterized by  Pol, did not have 
significant impacts on imports from these two superpowers. This implies that the two 
communist superpowers were overall stable suppliers to North Korean economy, and the 
total value of imports from the two countries is not much affected by the political situation. 
On the other hand, however, the change did have significant negative impacts on imports 
from the capitalist countries. One implication of this result is that the items imported from 
the two communist superpowers were different, and Sino-Soviet dispute might have impacts 
on imports of certain items. Then, Western industrialized countries filled the deficiency, if 
any, caused by Sino-Soviet dispute. Also, recalling that  1 = Pol  for the period leaning 
toward China, the negative impacts on imports from capitalist countries imply that North 
Korea imported less from the capitalist countries for the period leaning toward China. 
On the other hand, problems from foreign debts characterized by Open2 and Open3 
had significant impacts on the amount of imports. Especially the debt problem had 
considerable negative impacts on imports from capitalist countries. Also, imports were not 
improved by the new open-door policy initiated by Joint Venture Law of 1984, the beginning 
year of Open3. Instead, foreign debt problems were reducing the amount of NK’s imports 
even more as time went on despite the new open-door policy. This implies that the lost credit 
caused by the accumulated foreign debts damaged the economic relation between North 
Korea and the capitalist countries and that the relation was not improved by the new open 
door policy. 
 
2. For Different Commodity Groups 
 
Table 8 provides the results of estimation for different commodity groups. Data on 
each variable are the aggregation of imports from non-communist countries and from the 
former USSR.
11 For all commodity groups the income appears to be a significant variable in 
explaining imports except two cases, SITC 2 and SITC 3 (crude materials including mineral 
Fuels). In fact, income elasticity of imports is greater than unity for all groups of 
commodities except these two cases. Relative price, on the other hand, is not statistically 
significant at 5% level for all groups. 
On the other hand, the impacts of non-economic factors are not uniform across 
different commodity groups. Political changes are statistically significant in determining the 
imports of crude material including fuels (SITC 2 and SITC 3) and food & live animals 
(SITC 0). The negative values of the coefficient of Pol implies that more of these products 
are imported from the former Soviet Union than from China. The foreign debt problem of 
North Korea, characterized by Open2 and Open3, has significantly negative impacts on 
imports of food & live animals, manufactured goods and machinery (SITC 0, SITC 4, SITC 
6, SITC 7, and SITC 8). 
 
 
11. The data categorized b y UN’s SITC (Standard International Trade Classification) code is available only for 
capitalist countries and the former USSR during 1962-1992. LIM AND KIM: IMPORT DEMAND BEHAVIOR OF NORTH KOREA 
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Table 8  Results from Capitalists+USSR: by Commodity Groups 
  Const.  t Y log   t P log   1 log - t M   Correction
* 
for Correlations 
Pol  Open2  Open3 


























































































































































































Notes: The t-value is provided in each parenthesis below the coefficient estimate; 
* : Listed variables are included as 
regressors for correcting the correlations between difference of regressors and residual.   
SITC 0: Food & Live Animals; SITC 1: Beverages & Tobacco; SITC 2: Crude Materials except Fuels; SITC 
3: Mineral Fuels; SITC 4: Animal & Vegetable Oils; SITC 5: Chemicals; SITC 6: Basic Manufactured 
Goods; SITC 7: Machinery & Transport Equipment; SITC 8: Miscellaneous Manufactured Goods.   
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Table 9  Results from the Non-communist Countries: by Commodity Groups 
 
Const.  t Y log   t P log   1 log - t M   Correction
* 
for Correlations 
Pol  Open2  Open3 



























































































































































































The results in Table 8 are almost the same, with few exceptions, as those of Table 9 
which reports the results from data of non-communist countries only. Among the exceptions 
are the commodity groups SITC 2 (crude material except fuels) and SITC 5 (chemicals). 
More specifically, different from Table  8 Open2 and Open3 have negative impacts on the 
imports of SITC 2, and  Open3 has negative impacts on the imports of SITC 5. This 
difference in Table  9 from Table  8 implies that the foreign debts problem has negative 
impacts on the import of crude material during 1975-1992 and that of chemicals during 
1984-1992 from non-communist countries. In Table 9 we can also notice that the foreign 
debt problem has significantly negative impacts on the imports of all groups of commodities 
(except SITC 1and SITC 3) from non-communist countries. It shows how serious the 
resulting damage of credit loss was to North Korean economy.   
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V. Concluding Remarks  
 
We have studied some aspects of North Korean economy through its import behavior 
for which data are available from  its trading partners. We have found that for North Korean 
economy some non-market factors are important determinants of the import behavior. 
Among several results the ones with the following two implications are of particular interests. 
First, the two communist superpowers were overall stable and the most important suppliers 
to North Korean economy regardless of the political situation while Western industrialized 
countries filled the deficiency, if any, caused by Sino-Soviet dispute. Second, the foreign 
debts problem had significantly negative impacts on imports from the capitalist countries for 
most commodity groups, which is true even after the new open door policy initiated by the 
Joint Venture Law of 1984, implying that the lost credit caused by the accumulated foreign 
debts damaged the economic relation between North Korea and the capitalist countries and 
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